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1. Introduction
The process that matches students and universities resembles a market with some
peculiar features. Demand and supply of positions are discrete variables. Prices
(academic fees) are not flexible and cannot play the usual role of adjusting supply
and demand, although there is evidence that grants and loans can alter the cost of
college attendance and that students’ decisions are responsive to changes in related
prices and subsidies (see Paulsen [8] and [7]). Most importantly, college choice has
long-term effects on students’ future income. Thus, efficiency considerations make
it important not only to take students’ preferences into account, but to understand
the uncertainties they face and how the information available on college tuition
affects preferences.
In this paper, we model and test how the information acquisition process and
the cost of gathering information affects preference formation in a centralized
model of college admission. The model is an extended version of the two-sided
many-to-one matching model which has been extensively studied since the semi-
nal work of Gale and Shapley [2] (two excellent surveys are Roth and Sotomayor
[12] and Gusfield and Irving [3].) We introduce risk aversion and cost of gather-
ing information in the student’s decision and test the importance of information
on preference formation exploiting individual Spanish data from a 1990 survey
including both high school and university students.
Students often form images of schools based on inaccurate or limited infor-
mation (Kotler and Fox [5]). In this paper, students face uncertainty in future
returns from education in a specific college. Such uncertainty can nevertheless
be reduced by collecting college information. In our model, students first decide
whether to gather information about each college. Once this process is completed,
they fill in the list that they report to the matching office. Under this setting,
the student’s behavior is consistent with a model of risk aversion and information
costs.
We test the importance of information on preference formation by a two-fold
strategy. First, we study the probability that students would always choose the
same college as a first option irrespective of their high school results (satiation).
Then we proceed to analyze the probability of acceptance in the first choice. Our
results are important as they highlight the fact that the availability of information,
coming from both formal and informal channels, does affect students’ preferences
and choices. In this context, lowering the cost of information gathering would
be the simplest way to set up an allocation mechanism not affected by unequal
opportunities.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We give a brief description of
the Spanish college admission process in 1989 in Section 2. Section 3 deals with
the model whilst Section 4 contains a description of the data and presents the
empirical results. Finally, Section 5 offers some concluding comments.
2. The Spanish System of College Admissions in 1989
In Spain, colleges admit students coming from high school by using a ranking
based on a grade, which reflects previous performance, and the student’s high
school major (sciences, art, and joint studies). Given that each college is assigned
a target quota by an external administrative body, the ranking leaves no room
for colleges to influence their admission lists. The performance grade is obtained
computing an average between the students high school final grade and the result
from a regional examination called PAAU1. We will refer to this average as the
PAAU grade. The PAAU grade is a two-digit number between 0.00, the lowest
score, and 10.00, the maximum score that can be achieved. Students who want to
go to college must get a minimum score of five. If several students with identical
high school majors and the same PAAU grade are tied for the last position avail-
able in a given college, then all are admitted in the college.2 Before taking the
exam, students submit an ordered list of colleges to the central matching office.
On the list, there is a maximum number t of options which varies from one region
to another. At the period of reference, the lowest limit is eight possible declara-
tions. However, for some regions the “limit” is given by the size of the application
form, which is, in fact, greater than the number of options available.
Each university offers positions for different degrees, such as physics, history,
economics, etc. To keep with the traditional terminology in the matching liter-
ature, we refer to each one of these schools as a separate college. High school
students are assigned to their closest university for the PAAU exams. Only the
absence of a given degree can justify the application for a position in an university
different from that originally assigned. In practice, only a very small percentage
of students are allowed to study in a region other than the one they live in and
most students simply apply to the public universities of their region. At the time
1PAAU is the Spanish acronym for University Aptitude Entry Examination.
2Thus, target quotas do not neccesarily coincide with achieved quotas. However, the situation
only arises in a very small number of cases, as ties are extremely rare and do not usually involve
more than two students.
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of reference, there are only three districts, Madrid, Catalonia, and the Basque
Country, in which students can choose amongst the different Universities within
the district. Choice is thus reduced to type of training within the local university
for most of the students and type of training and university within the district
for students in Madrid, Catalonia, and the Basque Country.
Once regional matching offices have received all lists, a version of the Deferred
Acceptance Algorithm (DA) is used to allocate students to colleges within each
district or university. The Student-Proposing Deferred Acceptance Algorithm
used by the offices can be described by the following iteration:
Step 1: Each student makes an offer to the first college on her preference
list of acceptable colleges. Each college rejects the offer of any student who is
unaceptable to the college, and each college that receives more than one offer
“holds” only the q students with the highest PAAU grade (where q is the quota
of students assigned to the college).
Step k: Any student whose offer was rejected at the previous step makes an
offer to her next choice (i.e. to her most preferred college among those which have
not yet rejected her), so long as there remains an acceptable college to which she
has not yet made an offer. If a student has already offered a position to, and
has been rejected by all the colleges that she finds acceptable, then she makes
no further offers. Each college receiving offers rejects those from unacceptable
students, and also rejects all but its q most preferred students among the set
consisting of the new offers together with any student that it may have held from
the previous step.
Stop: The algorithm stops when no student’s offer is rejected. At this step,
every student is either being held by some college or has been rejected by every
college on her list of acceptable colleges. The output of the algorithm is the
matching at which each student is matched to the college where she is held when
the algorithm stops. Empty college positions and students who where rejected by
all their acceptable colleges remain unmatched.
This matching process leads to a stable matching that is Student-optimal in
the sense that all students unanimously consider the result to be the best stable
matching for them. At the end of the procedure the grade of the last student
admitted to a given college, the so-called “cut-off” grade, is made public. Before
the period of reference, entry grades had not historically shown large variations
from year to year.3 It is therefore reasonable to assume that in 1989 students
3This system was first implemented in the 1980s. For a number of colleges, quotas were
not binding, and “cut-off” grades were systematically the minimum score (5 points). Many
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foresee with accuracy the grade that will be required to enter a given college.
There are four reasons to test preference formation in the Spanish college
admission system in the period of reference. First, colleges play no role in the
process. There is evidence that in a system where the college has an active role,
there are factors other than the admittance test that are relevant for college deci-
sions (see Manski et al. [6] for an extensive comment on this issue). In the Spanish
system, however, this is not the case, and admission in a given college depends
only on the admittance test and the student’s high school curriculum. Colleges
are distributed among students according to the lists given by the students to the
public office and do not set policy on admissions or establish additional criteria
for admittance. This simplifies the decision that students face and allows us to
isolate the analysis on one side of the market.
Second, students’ behavior is predictable within our model. Although the
Spanish system is potentially open to manipulation in the short run as there are
limits in the number of options available (see Romero-Medina [9]), we claim that
students were in fact submitting sincere lists to the clearing office in 1989. This
situation changed gradually in the years after 1989. As many colleges raised their
entry requirements, students started filling their lists completely. For example,
by 1999, most students in Madrid were submitting lists with 15 options included,
the maximum number allowed.
Third, the source of uncertainty in the process of college choice is identified.
There are, a priori, three sources of uncertainty which are related to the students’
information acquisition process: (a) Students submit the lists before they know
their PAAU grade. However, students can anticipate these grades with accuracy
and, in fact, they have two days to change their lists after their grade is known.
Not surprisingly, very few of them do it. (b) “Cut-off” grades are unknown to
the students at the time of submitting the lists, but they had remained low and
constant previous to 1989. (c) Finally, there is uncertainty pertaining to the true
characteristics of the colleges. We assume that this is the fundamental source of
uncertainty that students face in the period of reference.
Finally, gathering college information is an option available to all Spanish stu-
dents especially since applications are mostly to local universities. This situation
has changed in the last years. On the one hand, improvements in the information
publicly available through formal channels has been substantial. On the other
colleges, however, did have “cut-off” grades that were greater than 5 and would vary from year
to year. Nonetheless, these variations were never greater than 0.34 points, a very small range
of variation.
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hand, more students have been allowed to apply to non-local universities.
3. A Behavioral Model of Matching
We consider a market with n students and l colleges. Let S = {s1, . . . , sn} and
C =
©
c1, . . . , cl
ª
be the set of students and colleges, respectively.
Students have some prior, possibly incomplete, information about the quality
of colleges. With this information student si forms her ex-ante preferences. We
shall assume that these preferences are based on the expected monetary payments
student si will receive for attending college c
j. In particular, her preferences
depend on earnings which are conditional on the success of her training at each
college.
Let ci
j be the monetary earnings, net of the monetary value of time, effort
and fees spent in college, for student si of attending and successfully finishing
her training in college cj in case cj is a “good option”. Similarly, let cji represent
the monetary earnings of attending (and perhaps dropping out from) college cj in
case cj is a “bad option”. The function
Ci :
©
c¯1i , c
1
i , c¯
2
i , c
2
i , ..., c¯
l
i, c
l
i
ª
→ R
takes into account both the monetary net earnings of attending a college and the
fact that those earnings depend on the affinity between students’ expectations
and performances. Thus Ci does not refer only to college quality, but also to the
complementarity between the college and the student.
We assume that students have a binomial probability distribution over each
college. Thus, cj can be a good option for student si with probability αji ∈ [0, 1],
and a bad option with probability (1− αji ). Then each college becomes a lottery
such that:
cji ≡ α
j
ici
j + (1− αji )c
j
i
Students have preferences %i on a lottery space $i satisfying the Von-Neuman-
Morgenstern axioms. Let ui(c
j
i ) : $→ R be the utility function of student si,
cji Âi cki ←→ ui(cji ) > ui(cki )
Therefore, ui(c
j
i ) is the utility that si has for studying at college c
j. Let us
call c¯ji the lottery α
j
iui(ci
j) + (1 − αji )ui(c
j
i ) when α
j
i = 1, and c
j
i the lottery
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αjiui(cij) + (1 − α
j
i )ui(c
j
i ) when α
j
i = 0. A student who is not admitted to any
college reaches a utility level ui (∅) = 0. That is, c = ∅ represents the situation
in which the student is not admitted by any college. We also require students’
preferences to be strict, i.e., for any two colleges ck,σ ∈ C ∪ ∅, ck 6= σ, either
ui(c
k
i ) > ui (c
σ
i ) or ui (c
σ
i ) > ui(c
k
i ). If ui (∅) is greater than the utility of attending
ck, then ck is called an unacceptable college for si in the sense that si will remain
unmatched rather than attend college ck.
Let us assume that ui(c
j
i ) is strictly-concave, i.e., the students are risk averse.
The utility for each college depends on the set of students it admits, say
Sj ⊆ S. Let uj : 2S −→ R be the utility function of college cj. A college which
does not admit any student obtains uj(∅). Each college cj has a predetermined
quota qj representing the maximum number of students it can admit. Any set of
students Sˆ containing more than qj students is such that uj(∅) > uj(Sˆ).
A matching describes which college (if any) admits each student and vice-
versa. More precisely, a matching µ is a correspondence that maps S ∪ C into
S ∪ C ∪ ∅ such that (a) for each si ∈ S, if µ (si) does not belong to C, then it is
the empty set; (b) for each cj in C, µ (cj) is contained in S or is equal to ∅, and
(c) for each pair (si, c
j) ∈ S × C, µ (si) = cj if and only if si belongs to µ (cj).
We are interested in college allocations that are stable. A matching is stable if
the following two conditions are satisfied. The first one is individual rationality:
each agent weakly prefers the payoff resulting from matching rather than being
unmatched. The second one is collective rationality: it is not possible for a college
and a group of students to reallocate in such a way that both, the college and the
students find the new situation more profitable.
A matching is stable if it is robust to deviations by a coalition of one college
and a group of students, or by a college or a student alone. These coalitions are
the only essential coalitions in this environment.
3.1. The Student’s Decision Process
We assume that students have a subjective ex-ante idea of the probability of being
admitted to a given college, in other words, the probability of achieving a given
grade in the admittance test. We denote the probability of the student si to be
admitted to college cj as pji .
The model follows the argument in Kotler and Fox ([5]) by assuming that
students form images of schools based on inaccurate or limited information. In
particular, students face uncertainty on future returns from completing college
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education in a particular college. However, this uncertainty can be reduced by
collecting information about each specific college. This process is costly so that
to collect information about college cj the student si must pay a cost ζji . Once
this cost is paid, the student knows with certainty whether attending that college
is a good or bad option.
Students submit an ordered list of colleges to the matching office. We shall say
that a student si submits a list according to her true preferences Pi when she ranks
all the acceptable colleges according to her utility from best to worse. Otherwise
she is misrepresenting her preferences. In this list Pi = c
1, c2, ..., si, c
l, cl+1, ..., cm
the college c1 is si’s preferred college, c
2 is her second choice, and so on. In this
list, all colleges after si are unacceptable options for si. From now on, we will not
include si, or any unacceptable college, on Pi for notational convenience.
Given Pi, the Students-optimal DA Algorithm is used to allocate students into
colleges. Given that the probabilities pji are known by student si
4, the expected
utility of the list Pi is:
Ui(Pi) =
³Xl
h=1
phi ui(c
h
i )
Yh
j=1
(1− pj−1i )
´
.
where, for notational convenience and without loss of generality, we add up
only those options acceptable according to Pi and c
1
i is the preferred college for
student si, c
2
i is her second choice, an so on.
Note that we are assuming that if a student obtains a given grade on her exam
she will be accepted to a given college. That is, we are assuming that entry grades
are fixed. If we assume a probability distribution on college preferences, which is
what we have before the PAAU exams take place, our framework becomes closer
to Roth and Rothblum [11]. However, their model is not totally equivalent to
ours, as they consider a model where the Colleges-optimal DA Algorithm is used
and colleges can admit only one student.
In order to eliminate uncertainty over the quality of college cj, a student si
must incur a cost ζji . As an example, if si has ex-ante complete information on
college cj, then αji is either 1 or 0. We say that student si is informed about
college cj and ζji = 0. The maximum amount that a student si is willing to pay
for the information on the quality of a given college cj is defined by the following
condition:
Ui(Pi | ζj∗i ) = Ui(P j∗i )
4These are subjective assessments made by student si based on the known behaviour of the
college and the distribution of preferences and PAAU grades.
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That is, the maximum fee ζj∗i that a person would pay, in advance of receiving
the information on the true characteristics of college cj, is such that it makes the
expected utility of the best informed action exactly equal to the expected utility
of the best uninformed action on college cj, Ui(P
j∗
i ). Based on student si true
preferences, Pi, let us denote as
...
P i(c
j, cji ) ≡
...
P i(c
j
i ) the list of colleges ordered from
best to worse according to si preferences where ui(c
j) has changed to ui
¡
cji
¢
. Let
us also denote as
...
P i(c¯
j) the list of colleges ordered from best to worse according to
si preferences where ui(c
j) has changed to ui (c¯
j) , and the student’s information
about the other colleges remains unchanged. Clearly,
...
P i(c
j, cj) ≡ Pi. The value
of information on college cj quality expressed in utility terms is Ui(Pi)−Ui(P j∗i ).
Therefore the maximum fee ζj∗i that a student would pay in advance of receiving
the complete information on college cj is such that:£
αjiUi(
...
P i(c
j
i , (c¯
j
i − ζ
j∗
i ))) + (1− α
j
i )Ui(
...
P i(c
j
i , (c
j
i − ζ
j∗
i )))
¤
= Ui(P
j∗
i )
To model the ex-post preference formation process, we propose the following
two-step procedure. Each student si has an ex-ante ranking of alternatives in
terms of the expected utility of each of the colleges. In the first step, the student
si must decide whether or not to collect information on each college. Let us call
Pˇi the ex-ante preference list for si. In the second step, the student si chooses the
list that maximizes her expected utility. Let us call Pˆi the ex-post preference list
for si. This list sorts colleges from best to worse and may contain both colleges
where she has collected information and colleges where she has not.
• First step:
— If
£
αjiUi(
...
P i(c
j
i , (c¯
j
i − ζ
j
i ))) + (1− α
j
i )Ui(
...
P i(c
j
i , (c
j
i − ζ
j
i )))
¤
≥ Ui(P j∗i ),
she will collect information for cj, and
— if
£
αjiUi(
...
P i(c
j
i , (c¯
j
i − ζ
j
i ))) + (1− α
j
i )Ui(
...
P i(c
j
i , (c
j
i − ζ
j
i )))
¤
< Ui(P
j∗
i ), she
will not collect information.
• Second step: she chooses the list of colleges P˜i that maximizes her expected
utility given the information collected during the first stage.
P˜i ≡ argmax
³Xl
h=1
phi ui(c
h
i )
Yh
j=1
(1− pj−1i )
´
.
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3.2. Strategic Behavior and the PAAU
It is well known that under the mechanism associated to the DA Algorithm, it
is a dominant strategy for students to declare their true preferences (Roth [10]).
However, limits on the number of options that can be declared can change this
property. In this case, the DA Algorithm generates stable allocations according
to the preferences declared by the students, but is no longer a dominant strategy
for students to declare their true preferences.
In practice, Spanish students at the period of reference usually did not declare
as many options as they had available. Therefore, they were either discarding
most of their feasible options or truncating their preferences. In theory, two types
of truncation are found: First, students declare truncated strategies as defined by
Roth and Vande Vate [13] and Roth and Rothblum [11].
Definition 1. Given Pi containing k acceptable colleges a truncation (from be-
low) of Pi is a strategy P
0
i containing k
0 ≤ k acceptable colleges such that the k0
elements of P 0i are the first k
0 elements of Pi, in the same order.
Second, students remove non-feasible alternatives from the top of their list.
This strategic behavior was described in Romero-Medina [9] as a way to restore
stability when only a limited number of options can be declared.
Definition 2. A truncation from above of a preference list Pi containing k ac-
ceptable colleges is a list P 0i containing k
0 ≤ k acceptable colleges such that the
k0 elements of P 0i are the last k
0 elements of Pi, in the same order.
In our model, there is no benefit for students from either including unaceptable
colleges or changing the order of acceptable colleges in the list submitted to the
matching office. Moreover, there is no gain derived from using truncation of any
kind. The result can be summarized in Theorem 3.1.
Theorem 3.1. If students can submit their preference lists without restrictions,
then no student can gain from a misrepresentation of preferences.
Thus, introducing risk aversion and costs of gathering information enriches the
model but does not alter its properties relating to strategic behavior. As in the
mechanism without risk aversion and cost of gathering information (Roth [10]),
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it is a dominant strategy for students to declare their true preferences when the
student-optimal DA Algorithm is applied.
However, given that students do not usually declare as many options as they
have available, it may be the case that they are not including their complete list
of acceptable colleges. A justification of such behavior is presented in Corollary
1. Truncation from below arises as natural behavior for students when they are
certain that they will be admitted to one of the colleges in the submitted list.
Corollary 1. Let P ki be a list Pi of si acceptable colleges truncated to its first k
elements. Let all the colleges in Pi be such p
h
i > 0. Then Ui(Pi) = Ui(P
k
i ) if and
only if the probability to obtain at least one of the colleges in P ki is equal to one.
Truncation from above arises in our two-step setting for the student’s decision
model because true preferences change as a result of the process of information
gathering. Therefore, once we rule out the possibility of strategic behavior in the
application process, the only factor that can lead to changes in the preferences of
risk-averse students is the costly acquisition of information.
Two factors will contribute to the change in preferences. On the one hand, the
fact that a student decides to acquire information about some colleges and not
about others might produce changes in the ranking. Colleges that have greater ex-
post utility will rise in the ranking and colleges with lower ex-post utility will fall
in the ex-post ranking. On the other hand, colleges with ex-ante greater variance
are ranked lower than alternatives with less variance but the same expected value.
Let us illustrate these results with a particular example.
Example 1. For a student si, let Pˇi = c
1, c2, c3, c4 be the ex-ante preference list,
Pˆi = c¯
2, c¯4, c¯3, c1i be the ex-post preference list, and p
4
i = 1. Finally, let P˜i = c
2, c4
be the final list submitted to the matching office.
In the example, student si has decided to gather information about colleges
c2, c3 and c4. College 1 is preferred ex ante but not ex post. Due to the result on
Corollary 1, although c1 is the most preferred ex-ante, it will not be on si final list
P˜i = c
2, c4. Based on a comparison of Pˇi and P˜i without taking into account the
information acquisition process, an independent observer could falsely conclude
that student si is acting strategically.
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3.3. Sources of Information
Students have two sources of information, namely institutional and informal sources
of information. Whilst students acquire informal information through a wide
range of channels, they are exposed to institutional information only in high school
centers. In particular, institutional information is provided by the educational in-
stitutions freely and unconditionally. According to the nature of the information
transmitted, institutional information can be either “menu” or “personal”. Stu-
dents receive “personal” information at interviews with psychologists and through
IQ tests. This helps students to focus on a smaller number of options that are
likely to be good matches. Thus, “personal” information changes parameters αji
and may totally reduce the uncertainty on future returns from completing a par-
ticular college education. “Personal” information can be exhaustive in the sense
that it satisfies the student’s informational demand and no further information
acquisition process should be expected. In contrast, “menu” information is given
to the student by means of written materials, oral presentations and audiovisual
information. “Menu” information opens the spectrum of possibilities for the stu-
dent and reduces the costs of acquiring further information. Thus, when “menu”
information is provided, an intensification of the information acquisition process
may be expected.
It is important to distinguish between the provision of “menu” information,
which takes place at educational centers, from the acquisition of information using
sources obtained through “menu” information. When teachers hand out leaflets
to the students, they are providing “menu” information that dramatically reduces
costs ζji . Later on, when students decide to read a selected subset of these leaflets
at home, they are acquiring information “informally”. Informal sources of infor-
mation can be of a quite varied nature, ranging from social networking to reading
leaflets. However, in all these methods of information acquisition, the student
willingly decides to acquire the information and incurs a cost for doing so.
Another distinction between institutional and informal information arises from
considering the timing of their provision. It is natural to think of institutional
information as one-off events, like the IQ test, or the interview with the school
psychologist. These events will likely change the students’s preferences and may
potentially affect the acquisition of informal information. Friendship and family
networks should also play a crucial role in the way preferences change. However,
information flows through these channels continuously, and it is plausible that
students get information through informal channels until the last day before filling
in the lists.
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3.4. Testable Hypotheses in the Student’s Decision Process
Differences in Pˇi and Pˆi are due to the acquisition of information before submitting
the preference list to the matching office. When neither Pˇi nor Pˆi are available
to the researcher, it is still possible to assess the importance of the process of
information acquisition by looking at features in students’ preferences that change
with the arrival of new information and are observable to the researcher.
In this paper, we study two such features. The first one is the probability of
being satiated, i.e. the probability of always choosing the same college regardless
of the grade at the PAAU examinations. The second feature is the probability
that a student is not restricted by the matching algorithm, i.e. her best option is
achievable.
It is of interest to know which students are most likely to change their pref-
erences. According to our model, the greater the chances to be admitted in a
college, the higher the chances that a student will seek information about a par-
ticular college. This can be seen by assuming that student si acquires information
about college cj. If pji increases, student si will still acquire information about col-
lege cj. However, there is always a value for pji below which student si will not
longer seek information on college cj. Likewise, the greater the cost of acquiring
information on a particular college, the lower the chances that students will seek
information on that college. To illustrate this point, consider that student si does
not acquire information about cj at cost ζji and ζ˜
j
i > ζ
j
i , then student si will
not acquire information about cj at cost ζ˜ji . Costs of acquiring information will
be individual-specific since individual characteristics, such as, for example, the
parent’s educational levels, affect them. Thus, individual characteristics will in-
fluence the likelihood of information acquisition and, therefore, the likelihood of a
change in preferences. In addition, institutional information will also affect both
preferences and the following process of information acquisition. All types of infor-
mation, both formal and informal, may change preferences directly. In addition,
when information is of a “menu” type, reducing costs leads to new information
and possibly a change in preferences through informal information acquisition.
4. The Data Set
The information we use is in CIS [1], “Los jo´venes ante el sistema educativo”. This
is a national survey carried out in April 1990 by the Centro de Investigaciones
Sociolo´gicas (CIS) with the cooperation of the Spanish Government. It consists
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of an initial sample of 7993 university students and 3770 high school students.
We restrict our analysis to ensure that the students in the sample are under
the same admission process by selecting last-year high school students that are
considering entering college in the future and first-year university students coming
from high school. We also restrict the sample to include students who will choose
or have chosen colleges within the same local area. After applying these filters,
the resulting sample size is 1163 high school students and 3177 college students.
Although some of the questions in the survey were specific to university and
some were specific to high school students, most of them were common or com-
parable. In particular, high school students were asked questions regarding their
preferences and first options at the time, while university students were asked
about the declaration they submitted to the matching office and their grades at
the entry examination in the year they went into university.
The survey was carried out in April 1990. That was two months before high
school students in their last year were required to submit their lists to the matching
office. Therefore, we have information on ex-ante preferences for high school
students and ex-post preferences for university students.
The survey includes two questions about the preferences of high school stu-
dents. The first one, question 22, has three sections.
Question 22: Which college would you choose if your PAAU grade were...?
1. (Q2201) between 5 and 6.5 points.
2. (Q2202) between 6.5 and 8 points.
3. (Q2203) between 8 and 10 points.
The second question of interest for our analysis is question 24, where we find
information on candidates’ expectations about their declarations in the college
matching protocol.5
Question 24 (Q24): Which college will you most likely end up choosing as your
first option?
5In the survey, there was another question reflecting how preferences would change if the
matching algorithm was changed and the PAAU grade was made irrelevant: Question 23. (If it
were just up to you, that is, the PAAU grade were irrelevant, which college would you choose?).
The question thus provides information about the value students assign to the PAAU grade
per-se.
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We also have information about the choices that current university students
made when they went through the PAAU matching process. First, for each uni-
versity student we have information about her first, second and third choice -
Questions Q1101, Q1102, and Q1103 respectively. We also know the college in
which they entered (Question Q13) and its position in the list of options (Ques-
tion Q12). Q24 for high school students is naturally associated with Q1101 for
university students. Unfortunately, students were not asked the length of their
submitted lists in the survey and there are no public figures available on this issue.
It is thus impossible to asses directly whether students used all options available
or truncated from below.
As it was previously discussed, truncation is not enough to restore stability in
the system when limits in the number of options to declare are present. In this
context, sophisticated students using “non-reverse” strategies can restore stabil-
ity. One such strategy is truncation “from above”, that is, dropping best choices
and moving the “window of options” down to more achievable targets. As al-
ready mentioned, we cannot directly test whether students are using non-reverse
strategies against declaring their true preferences. However, to the extent that
the limit of options available for students to declare was not binding, the signifi-
cance of non-reverse strategies to obtain stability would become irrelevant in this
particular case.
In the Spanish system at the time of the survey, there are two features that
make, in our opinion, the limit in the number of options irrelevant. First, the
“cut-off” grades are low for a large share of the colleges. Around a third of the
total number of colleges accept all students whose PAAU grade is higher than
the minimum required to enter any college. Second, the number of options varies
from region to region but it is never smaller than eight6. In addition, in Table 1,
we present the percentage of students in the University sample that declared less
than three options. We also show the distribution of Q12, that is, the position in
the list of the college where every student was finally admitted. Around 37% of
students declared less than three options and around 95% of students entered into
6It can be argued that the relevant number of options is not the number of colleges offered
by the local university, but the number of different entry grades. This is because students only
need to choose the best option within the set of colleges with the same entry grade. Only in 5
out of 22 districts can students have more than eight relevant options and only in three of them
is the number of options larger than 12: Madrid, Catalonia, and the Basque Country. More
importantly, if we restrict the options that students are considering to those most compatible
with the courses that they have taken in high school, then all students actually face less than
eight relevant options.
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one of their first three options. We have fitted a negative binomial distribution
for Q12. The estimated probability of non-admittance in one of the first 8 entries
in the list was smaller than 10−7. These results are consistent with the view that
students are not constrained by the limit in the number of options in the lists,
and that Q24 and Q1101 reflect the true best options of high school and college
students respectively.
Insert Table 1 around here
In the survey, differences in the empirical distribution of Q24 and Q1101 arise
from three different sources: First, students still get information on colleges in the
last two months before submitting their preference lists to the matching office.
Second, cohorts might have significant differences in college preferences as these
are related to long-term earnings expectations which change with the evolution
of labor market conditions. Finally, the list of college options in the survey is not
exactly the same as the list of college options in the real process and, in order to
answer the questionnaire, students had to adapt the true list codes to the survey
codes. We now discuss each of these three problems in detail.
4.1. Measures of Information
In the interviews, students were asked to state whether they had information on
colleges in their high school centres from any of the following means: tests, inter-
views with psychologists, written information, talks and conferences, and videos.
For those students already in college, the questions referred to the information
they had before taking the PAAU exams. Thus, by comparing the frequencies of
college and high school students that were exposed to these means of informa-
tion, we can assess to what extent institutional sources of information had been
employed two months before taking the PAAU exams. In Table 2, we present the
percentages of informed students within each group.
Insert Table 2 around here
The timing of the release of formal information to students depends on the
channel employed. The data suggest that the most frequent channels of “menu”
information, written information and talks, and to a lesser extent videos, had al-
ready been offered to students two months before taking the PAAU examinations.
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We also construct two measures of institutional informational exposure: per-
sonal and menu. Any student is said to have received “personal” information if
she has been exposed to either interviews or tests. In that case, personal takes
the unity. A student is said to have received “menu” information if she has been
exposed to either written information, talks, or videos.
Information obtained from casual or informal exposure is more difficult to
measure. In our data, we have potential variables that may help us control for
these effects, such as the father’s work status and education. Nonetheless, we
think that the notion of informal education is broader than these proxies. For
example, friendship and family networks should play a crucial role in the way
students shape their preferences (Hossler et al. [4].)
4.2. Cohort effects
Cohorts might have significant differences in college preferences as these are
strongly linked to long-term expected earnings associated to each degree. We
address this heterogeneity by restricting the analysis to high school students who
are considering entering college in October 1990, and university students in their
first year at college coming from high school. By doing so, we maximize the pro-
portion of students that were born within the same two years, namely 1971 and
1972.
4.3. College codes
Finally, the list of college options in the survey is a simplified version of the list of
college options in the real process. Since our aim is to determine the importance
of information acquisition in the preference formation process, we assume that all
distributional differences between Q24 and Q1101 are due to mismatches in the
codings. We set up a restricted clustering algorithm for colleges so that the new
codings in Q24 and Q1101 are comparable, i.e. the distribution of the best options
in the university sample must be similar to the distribution of the best option in
the high school sample . The algorithm works as follows: we assume that high
school students encounter classification problems only for colleges within the same
area of knowledge and with the same minimum university entry requirements.
Thus only these colleges can be clustered into one single college category. The
clustering algorithm searches for the two colleges such that once clustered into
one category, the overall distribution of college categories in Q1101,the university
sample, and Q24, the high school sample, look closer in terms of the χ2 test
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for differences in the frequencies. We proceed recursively until the difference in
distributions is not statistically significant at the 99 percent level. Of course, this
strategy implies that when we use the new college codings, we bias our analysis
by minimizing the impact of the information acquisition process in the last two
months before submission of the preference list.7
We find that using the original survey codes leads to strongly rejecting the
null hypothesis of the equality in the distribution of colleges in the two questions.
Once the amalgamation procedure finishes, we still have 27 college categories.
Within these college categories, the distribution of questions Q24 and Q1101 -the
first option two months in advance and the first option for the cohort of students
from the previous year- are not statistically different.
In the following section, we present results using both the original survey codes
for colleges and the cluster college categories. The latter will be referred to as
“cluster codes” from now on.
5. The results
As indicated by Corollary 1, truncation from below is a natural outcome of utility
maximization. As the Spanish system was not binding in the limit of options
available, we assume that strategic behavior is irrelevant. In this section, thus,
we study the importance of information gathering in the last two months prior to
the PAAU exams.
In order to study the process of information in the last two months before
submitting the lists, we must compare a feature of the preferences of high school
and college students. Our testing strategy consists of a two-step procedure. First,
we study the probability that students would always choose the same college as a
first option irrespective of their High School results (satiation). Then we proceed
to analyze the probability of acceptance in the first choice.
5.1. The empirical model of satiation
A student shows satiation in college preferences whenever she chooses the same
college irrespective of her PAAU grade. The survey allows us to identify satiated
students amongst the sample of high school students. The logical condition that
7A detailed description and the results of the clustering algorithm can be found in Appendix
II.
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defines a satiated student in the sample is the equality in the answers of questions
Q2201, Q2202, Q2203, and Q24.
As similar information is not available for university students, we cannot iden-
tify satiated students amongst them. Therefore, it is not possible to study the role
of information acquisition in the last two months before submitting the lists for
satiation. Nevertheless, it is still possible to assess the importance of the different
information channels in the characterization of satiation as a feature of students’
preferences. In order to do so, we use a probit specification for a dummy variable
which reflects whether or not the high school student is satiated.
The empirical model of satiation includes four socio-demographic variables
which potentially affect the students preferences and satiation. Dummy variable
Attended Public School takes value 1 whenever the student attends a state high
school. The variable Female refers to the student gender while Lost at least 1 year
takes value 1 whenever the student had to repeat at least one year. Finally, Con-
sidered training courses shows whether the student was interested in abandoning
high school education in order to enter training courses.
Dummy variables reflecting the student’s motivation to choose a particular
college are Vocation, Good marks in the field, Money, To stay in the same city,
and To leave the city. The variables Sciences and Arts are related to two of the
three majors students can take in high school, the third one being Joint studies.
In order to study the role of information acquisition on preference formation,
the most relevant variables in the model of satiation are linked to the student’s
family background and the official information already received two months be-
fore submitting the list. In particular, we include dummy variables for Family
tradition and Parents’ will as a reason to attend a college. We also include three
variables describing the father’s socio-economic status: whether or not he is a
manager (Manager); whether or not he is a worker with no qualifications (Father
unskilled); and whether or not he holds a college degree (Father attended College).
Unfortunately, there is no information in the survey related to the mother’s so-
cial background. However, given the observed strong tendency for couples to sort
themselves according to socio-economic status, variables relating to the father can
reasonably be understood to proxy the family’s status as a whole.
Finally, we include dummy variables describing whether the student has al-
ready received “menu” type information, Menu, and whether or not she has al-
ready received “personal” type information, Personal.
Results of the probit estimates are presented in Table 3. Column 1 presents the
point estimates, Column 2 shows the probability changes when the corresponding
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dummy variable changes its value from 0 to 1 (evaluated at average values for
the other controls), and, finally, p-values are reported in Column 3. We present
results using original survey codes.
Insert Table 3 around here
A number of variables do not seem to affect the probability of being satiated.
These include Attended Public School,Woman, Considered training courses, Good
marks in the field, To stay in the same city, Manager, Father unskilled, and the
official information variables Menu and Personal. Some variables decrease the
probability of satiation, although the estimated effect is not significant. They are
To leave the city, Arts, and Parents’ will.
Two dummy variables increase the probability of satiation by at least 20 per-
centage points each. The first one, Family tradition, might be capturing the effect
of unofficial information, whilst the second one, Vocation, suggests that the prob-
ability of satiation is highly influenced by the existence of very strong preferences
in favor of a particular college.
Finally, four variables are found to significantly reduce the chances of satiation.
Students who previously lost at least 1 year, those who will choose colleges for
the money opportunities later on, those whose father had been in college, and
finally those whose major is Sciences, are less likely to choose the same college
regardless of the PAAU grade that they obtain. The strongest effect is found
amongst Science students, who are less likely to be satiated than the reference
Joint Studies students by 32 percentage points.
To sum up, our results suggest that satiation is only partly related to infor-
mation acquisition. Whilst family background may be important in changing the
likelihood of the student being satiated, official information, either of the “menu”
or of the “personal” type, does not have any effect on it. We also find that some
“restricted” students (those who lost at least 1 year and those who are studying
Sciences) are less likely to be satiated.
5.2. Information acquisition in the last two months
We have yet not provided a measurement on how important the problem of infor-
mation acquisition in the last two months is. In our model, differences in Pˇi and
Pˆi for last-year high school students are due to the acquisition of information. We
need to study a feature in the preferences that changes with new information and
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it is observable and comparable in the two samples. We choose the probability
that a student is not restricted by results in PAAU examinations, i.e. her best
option is always achievable.
For university students, we identify unrestricted students as those who entered
in their first choice. For high school students, we identify restricted students
as those who gave different answers, using cluster codes, to questions Q24 and
Q2203. Since Q2203 is their best option if they had the highest mark in the PAAU
exam, this is a conservative condition for the definition of restricted students.
In particular, so-defined restricted students are only a subset of the real set of
restricted students since there will be some individuals with Q24 equal to Q2203
who will end up in a different college than the first option. However, given that
students can accurately assess their chances to enter any college and that the
proportion of individuals entering into their first option is near 75 percent, the
importance of this group is likely to be minor.
Changes between the university sample and the high school sample in the
probability of being restricted reflect, ceteris paribus, the influence of information
acquisition in the last two months of the process. Our testing strategy is twofold.
We first present the results of the comparison of the frequencies of unrestricted
individuals for specific groups in the two-month period. We also carry out means
tests for these percentages and the results are presented in Table 4. Then we
model the probability of being unrestricted as a probit model. The results for the
probit model are presented in Table 5.
Insert Table 4 around here
The percentage of university students who entered into their first option is
around 74.25 percent. In contrast, we see that only around 46.75 percent of high
school students reveal that they are not restricted by the exam. Conditioning by
type of student yields the same basic result: there is an increase of around 27
percentage points in first option admittances in the last two months. Most im-
portantly, differences are larger for uninformed students, those with low-education
parents, and science students. This result suggests that there is a fundamental
process of information acquisition that restricts the number of candidate colleges
in the last two months. As a result of this process, the probability of an individual
entering into the first option must increase.
To test this interpretation, we proceed by estimating a model of the probability
of being unrestricted controlling for the sample definition of being unrestricted.
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For simplicity, we will present here the results of a probit specification although
other specifications, such as the linear probability and the logit models, yield
similar results. A useful variable specification, assuming no control variables apart
from the information-related dummies, takes the following form:
Pr(Unrestricted | Menu, Personal, University) = Φ(Constant+
+β1 ·Menu+ β2 · Personal
+γ1 ·Menu · Univ + γ2 · Personal · Univ
+γ3 ·Menu · Personal · Univ
+θ ·NotInf · Univ)
where Univ takes value 1 for the university sample and NotInf takes value 1
if the student has not been informed through official channels. This variable spec-
ification allows us to identify the effect of information on each stage. First, the
effect of unofficial information two months in advance is reported in the constant
term, together with other factors whose effects are constant within the sample.
Note that we do not know whether university students received their official in-
formation before or after the two-month limit. However, if we assume that the
effect of the provision of official information is the same before or after the two-
month limit, then the effect of “menu” information is estimated by the parameter
β1whilst the effect of personal information is estimated by β2. It follows that θ
shows the effect of unofficial information in the last two months when individuals
have not received any official information. When the student receives “menu”
information, then the effect of unofficial information in the last two months will
be reported in γ1. Likewise, when individuals receive “personal” information, this
effect will be γ2 and, when they receive both types of official information, it will
be γ3.
In addition to the information variables, the model of restriction includes the
same control variables as the model of satiation. Results of the probit estimates
are presented in Table 5. As in the case of the model of satiation, standard
measures of goodness-of-fit, as the Cramer R2 or the pseudo-R2 are low, although
the success prediction rate reaches 76 per cent of the cases. However, in spite of
this seemingly disappointing low fit, the model clearly outperforms the constant
model in the sense that the Wald test for the joint slope coefficients is strongly
rejected.
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Insert Table 5 around here
A number of socio-economic variables do not have significant effects on the
probability of being unrestricted. Amongst them, we find Attended Public School,
Female,Money, To stay in the same city, and more interestingly, Family tradition,
Father informed, and Father unskilled. It could be argued that, according to our
model, students with a strong family tradition may have very valuable information
that would undoubtedly help them in adjusting to their best option. However,
this reading of the results would not be without controversy, as the variable itself
reflects whether the student would choose a college because of family tradition,
and not whether the family helps in the information process. In contrast, the es-
timates for both Father attended College and Father unskilled are of the expected
signs, but not significant.
All the other socio-economic variables are significant at conventional levels,
perhaps with the exception of Manager, with a p-value of 7 per cent. A number
of coefficients have negative values, showing that individuals with those charac-
teristics are more likely to be restricted in the sense that they cannot reach their
best option. These include Lost at least 1 year, Considered training courses, To
leave the city, and Sciences. In contrast, Vocation, Good marks in the field, Arts,
Parents’ will, and Manager all show positive and significant estimates. Of course,
both Parents’ will and Manager are proxies for an influential family background
which helps the student obtain information. Thus, their effect should be counted
as part of the unofficial information effect on preference formation two months
before submitting the lists.
With respect to the information gathering variables, we find some interesting
results. First, “menu” information two months before does not have any signifi-
cant effect, but it does have a very strong negative effect in the last two months,
suggesting that individuals who receive “menu” information widen their prospects
and tend to include more “unreachable” colleges than students without this infor-
mation. The effect of “personal” information is almost the opposite: a negative
sign two months before, although only significant at the 5 per cent significance
level, and a very significant effect in the last two months. The effect of receiving
both types of information and the effect of not-receiving any type of information
are negligible for the university sample.
We summarize the information results and perform some χ2 tests in Table 6.
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Insert Table 6 around here
The overall effect of the family background (a composite index including Fam-
ily tradition, Parents’ will, Manager, Father unskilled -with a negative sign-, and
Father attended College) is, as expected, positive and significant. The overall
effect of official information is not significant. However, the effect of unofficial
information differs strongly amongst students. Those students who only received
“menu” information are more likely to be restricted. In contrast, those students
who have received “personal” information in the last two months of the process ex-
perienced a positive and significant increase in their chances to be unconstrained,
as the model would suggest. Those who have received both types of information
do not show any significant effect from unofficial information, as is the case for
those who received no official information at all.8
6. Conclusions
In this paper, we consider a many-to-one two-sided matching model with a public
office acting as intermediator amongst students who seek a post in the higher
educational system and the suppliers of these posts - the universities. We model
the process of preference formation in the students by introducing risk aversion in
students preferences and a costly process for collecting information. In our model,
students first decide whether to gather information about each college. After the
process of obtaining information is finished, they fill in the list that they report
to the matching office.
To contrast the importance of information gathering, we estimate probit mod-
els for both the probability of being satiated and the probability of entering in the
first option. We compare college preferences from students in high school with
the choices that were submitted to the matching office a year before by university
students. Among the results of our empirical analysis, we emphasize the following:
8These results seem to conflict with those in the US college choice process ( Hossler et al.
[4]), where they claim that the junior year and the first months of the senior year in high school
are the time frame during which most students move from the search stage to the choice stage
of students college choice. Of course, the results are not strictly comparable as the processes of
college choice and admission differ fundamentally in the timing. In particular, colleges in the
U.S. play an important role in the process and it is in the students’ interests that they make
important decisions earlier than two months before allocation takes places.
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Changes in preferences revealed in the data suggest that information gathering
is important in the last two months before students must report the list to the
matching office. Second, students with less information are more affected by these
preference changes.
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Figure 1: The Sequence of χ2 Tests and p-Values in the Clustering Algorithm
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Figure 2a: College Distribution for University and High-School Students with CIS Codes
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Figure 2b: College Distribution for University and High-School Students with “cluster codes”
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Table 1: Lists submitted by College Studentsa
Position 1 2 3 4 5 7 7 8
Lists’ Length 19.01 18.01
(Cumulative) 19.01 37.02
Entry Position 73.91 14.41 7.14 1.22 0.97 0.50 0.34 0.22
(Cumulative) 73.91 88.32 95.46 96.68 97.65 98.15 98.49 98.71
aDistribution (%) of students by list’s length and the position of entry College
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Table 2: Percentage of Students with official
information on collegesa
College Sample High School Sample
Tests 30.61 19.29
Interviews 21.49 14.02
Written information 59.40 65.75
Talks 74.27 74.41
Videos 17.48 27.48
Personal Informationb 37.81 26.22
Menu Informationc 84.95 89.76
aFor College students, reported percentages refer to the share of students
who received information before taking the PAAU exam.
bTests and/or interviews
bWritten information and/or talks and/or videos
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Table 3: The Model of Satiation
( 1 ) ( 2 ) ( 3 )
Attended Public School -0.04 -1.58 0.727
Female 0.10 3.77 0.396
Lost at least 1 year -0.26 -10.07 0.019
Considered training courses -0.13 -5.10 0.445
Vocation 0.53 20.73 0.008
Good marks in the field -0.02 -0.68 0.876
Money -0.37 -14.48 0.003
To stay in the same city 0.03 1.27 0.853
To leave the city -0.31 -12.21 0.142
Sciences -0.85 -32.08 0.000
Arts -0.23 -9.19 0.253
Family tradition 0.67 24.25 0.006
Parents’ will -0.39 -15.34 0.121
Father unskilled 0.02 0.91 0.911
Manager 0.03 1.35 0.842
Father attended College -0.24 -9.68 0.053
Personal 0.10 3.85 0.436
Menu 0.09 -3.62 0.626
Constant 0.76 0.020
Log Likelihood -381.099
pseudo-R2 0.1015
Cramer -R2 0.1313
Number of observations 614
LR tests for joint significance of slopes 86.11 0.000
( 1 ) Maximum Likelihood estimates for probit estimates. The
pseudo-R2 is the scaled value of the likelihood function whereby
100 is perfect fit and 0 is the constant model.
( 2 ) Probability change when the corresponding dummy variable
changes its value from 0 to 1 (evaluated at average values for the
other controls)
( 3 ) p-values
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Table 4: Means Tests of Preference Change
High Schoola Universityb Means Testc
CIS Codes Cluster Codes CIS Codes Cluster codes
All 43.68 46.78 74.25 18.55 16.59
Arts 46.90 49.66 83.48 8.41 7.76
Joint Studies 46.37 47.98 78.01 8.86 8.40
Sciences 42.24 45.92 68.54 12.47 8.49
Uninformedd 42.90 45.94 74.01 17.60 15.79
Informed 47.91 50.52 73.96 4.94 5.70
Father unskilled 41.18 42.96 73.95 15.32 14.41
Father attended College 46.36 51.14 75.02 10.96 9.11
aPercentage of high school students with Q24 equal to Q2203
bPercentage of university students entering in their first option
ct-test for equality of percentages. All values are significant at the 99% level
dStudent did not receive any official information
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Table 5: The Model of Non-Restriction.
(1) (2) (3)
Attended Public School -0.04 -1.30 0.487
Female 0.03 0.88 0.629
Lost at least 1 year -0.13 -4.00 0.022
Considered training courses -0.19 -6.26 0.037
Vocation 0.59 20.02 0.000
Good marks in the field 0.18 5.50 0.003
Money 0.02 0.50 0.790
To stay in the same city -0.10 -3.25 0.235
To leave the city -0.40 -13.69 0.001
Sciences -0.42 -12.66 0.000
Arts 0.16 4.80 0.050
Family tradition -0.01 -0.42 0.918
Parents’ will 0.25 7.11 0.036
Father unskilled -0.13 -4.09 0.195
Manager 0.20 5.60 0.077
Father attended College 0.10 3.16 0.121
Personal 0.09 2.69 0.425
Personal x Univ -0.47 -15.25 0.097
Menu -0.40 -10.75 0.037
Menu x Univ 0.25 7.86 0.001
Menu x Personal x Univ 0.30 8.50 0.283
NotInf x Univ -0.15 -4.69 0.507
Constant 0.68 0.002
Log Likelihood -1284.643
pseudo-R2 0.0764
Cramer -R2 0.0848
Number of observations 2589
LR tests for joint significance of slopes 212.62 0.000
( 1 ) Maximum Likelihood estimates for probit estimates. The
pseudo-R2 is the scaled value of the likelihood function whereby
100 is perfect fit and 0 is the constant model.
( 2 ) Probability change when the corresponding dummy variable
changes its value from 0 to 1 (evaluated at average values for the
other controls)
( 3 ) p-values
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Table 6: The Model of Non-Restriction:
Summary and χ2 Tests
Coef. χ2 p-value
Social Background 0.416 9.760 0.002
Menu Information before last 2 months 0.089 0.637 0.425
Personal Information before last 2 months -0.398 4.341 0.037
Official Information before last 2 months -0.309 4.737 0.094
Unofficial last 2 months if previously Menu -0.466 2.748 0.097
Unofficial last 2 months if prev. Personal 0.254 10.581 0.001
Unofficial last 2 months if prev. both 0.083 0.542 0.461
Unofficial last 2 months if prev. none -0.147 0.441 0.507
aSocial Background =Family tradition + Parents’ will + Manager
-Father unskilled + Father informed
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Appendix I
Lemma 1. No student can benefit from including unaceptable colleges in the list
Pi submitted to the matching office.
Proof. We proceed by contradiction. Let college ck be such ui(∅) > ui(cki ). College
ck will not be ranked on Pi = c
1, c2, c3, ..., cl. Let Pˆ 0i be the list that includes all the
elements in Pi, in the same order, Pˆ
0
i also includes c
k. Without lost of generality
let us assume that Pˆ 0i = c
k, c1, c2, c3, ..., cl. Let
U(Pi) =
Xl
h=1
phi ui(c
h
i )
Yh
j=1
(1− pj−1i )),
and
U(P 0i ) = p
k
i ui(c
k
i ) + (1− pki )
Xl
h=1
phi ui(c
h
i )
Yh
j=1
(1− pj−1i )).
We will assume that
U(Pˆ 0i ) > U(Pˆi).
Hence,
pki ui(c
k
i ) + (1 − pki )
Pl
h=1p
h
i ui(c
h
i )
Qh
j=1(1 − p
j−1
i )) >
Pl
h=1p
h
i ui(c
h
i )
Qh
j=1(1 −
pj−1i )). This expression implies that
pki ui(c
k
i ) > p
k
i
Xl
h=1
phi ui(c
h
i )
Yh
j=1
(1− pj−1i )).
Given that ui(∅) > ui(cki ) then
pki
lX
h=1
phi ui(c
h
i )
hY
j=1
(1− pji )) ≥ 0.
A contradiction.
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Lemma 2. Let Pi be a list that sorts si acceptable colleges from best to worse
according with si preferences. There is no benefit in a change in the order between
two colleges ct, cki ∈ C in the preference list Pi.
Proof. Let us assume that ui(c
t
i) > ui(c
k
i ) let us denote as P
tk
i the list where c
t and
cki preserve their order and as P
kt
i the list where the colleges switch their ranks.
Let τ be the position that t has in P tki . Therefore
τX
h=1
phi ui(c
h
i )
hY
j=1
(1− pj−1i )
remains identical in both lists.
Let κ be the position that k has in P tki . Therefore
lX
h=κ
phi ui(c
h
i )
hY
j=1
(1− pji )
remains identical in both lists. It remains to be seen that
ptiui(c
t
i)
Qt
j=1(1− p
j−1
i ) +
Pk
h=t+1 p
h
i ui(c
h
i )
Qh
j=1(1− p
j−1
i ) > p
k
i ui(c
k
i )
Qk
j=1(1−
pj−1i ) +
Pt
h=k+1 p
h
i ui(c
h
i )
Qh
j=1(1− p
j−1
i ).
Let us assume, without lost of generality, that colleges ct, cki ∈ C are the
first and the last element, respectively in the preference list Pi . Let P
tk
i be
ct, ct+1, ..., ck−1, ck and let P kti be c
k, ct+1, ..., ck−1, ct.
ptiui(c
t
i) + (1− pti)pki ui(cki ) > pki ui(cki ) + (1− pki )ptiui(cti),
then
−ptipki ui(cki ) > −ptipki ui(cti),
Therefore
ui(c
t
i) > ui(c
k
i ).
We will proceed iteratively including ct+1, ..., ck−1 successively in the list. We
will start with ct+1 :
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ptiui(c
t
i) + (1 − pti)pt+1i ui(ct+1i ) + (1 − pti)(1 − pt+1i )pki ui(cki ) > pki ui(cki ) + (1 −
pki )p
t+1
i ui(c
t+1
i ) + (1− pki )(1− pt+1i )ptiui(cti).
Given that
pt+1i p
k
i (ui(c
t+1
i )− ui(cki )) ≥ ptipt+1i pki (ui(ct+1i )− ui(cki )),
ptip
k
i (ui(c
t
i)− ui(cki )) > 0,
and
ptip
t−1
i (ui(c
t
i)− ui(ct−1i )) > 0,
hence,
ptip
k
i (ui(c
t
i) − ui(cki )) + pt+1i pki (ui(ct+1i ) − ui(cki )) + ptipt−1i (ui(cti) − ui(ct−1i )) >
ptip
t+1
i p
k
i (ui(c
t+1
i )− ui(cki )),
Let us introduce ct+2in the list. To maintain the inequality it must be proved
that change in the right hand side of the inequality is greater than the change in
the left hand side, i.e.
(1 − pti)(1 − pt+1i )pt+2i ui(ct+2i ) − pt+2i ui(cki ) > (1 − pki )(1 − pt+1i )pt+2i ui(ct+2i ) −
pt+2i ui(c
t
i).
Therefore
(1− pt+1i )pt+2i (pki − pti)ui(ct+2i ) + pt+2i (ui(cti)− ui(cki )) > 0. (6.1)
Given that
pt+2i (p
k
i − pti)ui(ct+2i )− pt+1i pt+2i (pki − pti)ui(ct+2i ) > 0
and
ui(c
t
i)− ui(cki ) > 0
the expression 6.1 is positive.
Proceeding iteratively with all colleges from ct+3 to ck−1 we conclude
ptiui(c
t
i)+
Pk
h=t+1 p
h
i ui(c
h
i )
Qh
j=t(1−p
j−1
i ) > p
k
i ui(c
k
i )+
Pk−1
h=t+1 p
h
i ui(c
h
i )
Qh
j=1(1−
pj−1i ) + p
t
iui(c
t
i)
Qk−1
j=1(1− p
j−1
i ).
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Lemma 3. Let Pi be a list that sorts si acceptable colleges from best to worse
according to si preferences. There is no benefit in truncating from below the
preference list Pi.
Proof. Let Pi be a preference list and let P
0
i be a truncation from below of Pi .
U(Pi) =
lX
h=1
phi ui(c
h
i )
hY
j=1
(1− pji ) and
U 0(P
0
i ) =
kX
h=1
phi ui(c
h
i )
hY
j=1
(1− pji ) for k ≥ 1
We shall prove the statement by contradiction. Let us assume that
kX
h=1
phi ui(c
h
i )
hY
j=1
(1− pj−1i ) >
lX
h=1
phi ui(c
h
i )
hY
j=1
(1− pj−1i ) (6.2)
If pti = 1 for t < k the statement 6.2 is not true because in this case both
expressions are identical.
Let us assume that pti 6= 1 for all t ≥ k.Wewill proceed to prove the proposition
by contradiction. Let us assume that a truncated list generates a greater expected
utility than a complete list. In that case:
kX
h=1
phi ui(c
h
i )
hY
j=1
(1− pj−1i ) >
lX
h=1
phi ui(c
h
i )
hY
j=1
(1− pj−1i ) (6.3)
Then, if we add another element to the list, the element k+1,the expected utility
of adding this new element is
pk+1i ui(c
k+1
i )
k+1Y
j=1
(1− pj−1i ) ≥ 0. (6.4)
In this case,Pk
h=1 p
h
i ui(c
h
i )
Qh
j=1(1−p
j−1
i )+p
k+1
i ui(c
k+1
i )
Qk+1
j=1(1−p
j−1
i ) ≥
Pk
h=1 p
h
i ui(c
h
i )
Qh
j=1(1−
pj−1i )
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We can add elements k+ 2, k+3 and so on, until we recompose the complete
list. All additional elements generate increments in the expected utility of the
resulting list as in expression 6.4. Therefore,
lX
h=1
phi ui(c
h
i )
hY
j=1
(1− pj−1i ) >
kX
h=1
phi ui(c
h
i )
hY
j=1
(1− pj−1i ). (6.5)
However, by transitivity and expressions 6.5 and 6.3:
lX
h=1
phi ui(c
h
i )
hY
j=1
(1− pj−1i ) >
lX
h=1
phi ui(c
h
i )
hY
j=1
(1− pj−1i ).
A contradiction.
Lemma 4. Let Ph be a list that sorts si acceptable colleges from best to worse
according with sh preferences. There is no benefit in truncating from above the
preference list Ph.
Proof. Let Ph be a preference list and let P
0
h be a truncation from above of Ph.
U(Ph) =
lX
h=1
phi ui(c
h
i )
hY
j=1
(1− pj−1i ) and
U 0(P 0h) =
lX
h=k
phi ui(c
h
i )
hY
j=k
(1− pj−1i ) for k > 1.
We shall prove the statement by contradiction. Let us assume that
lX
h=k
phi ui(c
h
i )
hY
j=k+1
(1− pj−1i ) >
lX
h=1
phi ui(c
h
i )
hY
j=1
(1− pj−1i )
If pti = 1 for t < k then the statement is not true because ui(c
t
i) > ui(c
k
i ) and
tX
h=k
phi ui(c
h
i )
hY
j=k+1
(1− pj−1i ) > ui(cti).
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Let us assume that pti 6= 1 for all t ≥ k. In that case:
lX
h=k
phi ui(c
h
i )
hY
j=k+1
(1− pj−1i ) >
lX
h=1
phi ui(c
h
i )
hY
j=1
(1− pj−1i )
then
pk−1i ui(c
k−1)+(1−pk−1i )
Pl
h=k p
h
i ui(c
h
i )
Qh
j=k+1(1−p
j−1
i ) >
Pl
h=k p
h
i ui(c
h
i )
Qh
j=k+1(1−
pj−1i )
This is because ui(c
k−1) > ui(c
k
i ) for all k. If this is the case p
k−2
i ui(c
k−2)+(1−
pk−1i )
³
pk−1i ui(c
k−1) + (1− pk−1i )
Pl
h=k p
h
i ui(c
h
i )
Qh
j=k+1(1− p
j−1
i )
´
≥ pk−1i ui(ck−1)+
(1− pk−1i )
Pl
h=k p
h
i ui(c
h
i )
Qh
j=k+1(1− p
j−1
i )
Then
lX
h=1
phi ui(c
h
i )
hY
j=1
(1− pj−1i ) >
lX
h=k
phi ui(c
h
i )
hY
j=k+1
(1− pj−1i ).
A contradiction.
Corollary 1. Let P ki be a list Pi of si acceptable colleges truncated to its first
k elements. Let all the colleges in Pi be such p
h
i > 0. Then Ui(Pi) = Ui(P
k
i ) if and
only if the probability to obtain at least one of the colleges in P ki is equal to one.
Proof. By Lemma 4 U(Pi) ≥ U(P ki ). If U(Pi) = U(P ki ) then the expected value
of the elements eliminated U(Pi/P
k
i ) is zero. Given that all colleges on Pi are all
acceptable colleges and, therefore their utility is greater than zero, their proba-
bility must be zero. Given that we have assumed that all colleges have positive
probability then a college in P ki has probability 1.
Theorem 3.1. If the students can submit their preference list without re-
strictions no student can profit from a misrepresentation of her preferences.
Proof. It follows from Lemmas 1 to 4.
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Appendix II
As discussed in the main text, the list of college options in the survey is
not exactly the same as the list of college options in the real process. Since
our aim in this paper is to determine the importance of information acquisition
in the preference formation process, we proceed by the following identification
assumption. We suppose that all differences between Q24 and Q1101 are due to
mismatches in the codings.
We set up a restricted clustering algorithm for colleges so that the new codings
in Q24 and Q1101 are comparable. The restricted clustering algorithm works as
follows. We assume that high school students encounter classification problems
only for colleges within the same area of knowledge and with the same minimum
university entry requirements: Most 5-year courses require passing the PAAU
exam whilst for 3-year courses there is no such requirement. However, students do
not misclassify between two colleges of different areas of knowledge, or a college
that requires passing the PAAU test and a college that does not. Thus, only
colleges within the same area of knowledge and minimum entry requirements can
be clustered into one single college category. The clustering algorithm searches
for the two colleges such that once clustered into one category, the distribution
of college categories in Q1101 and Q24 look closer. We make the comparison by
computing χ2 tests for differences in frequencies and cluster the two colleges that
minimize the χ2 test. We proceed recursively until the difference in distributions
is not statistically significant at the 99 percent level. The results of this clustering
algorithm are presented in Figure 1.
Insert Figure 1 around here
Although the procedure does not guarantee a decrease in the χ2 test at each
step, we can see in Figure 1 that this is what happens. The reduction in χ2
follows an exponential form, implying that our χ2 statistic is strongly affected
by a few misclassifications. In terms of p-values, we find that using the original
survey codes for colleges leads to strongly rejecting the null hypothesis of the
equality in the students distributions across colleges in the two questions. Once
the amalgamation procedure finishes, we still have 27 college categories. Within
these college categories, the distribution of questions Q24 and Q1101 -the expected
first option two months in advance and the actual first option for the cohort
of students from the previous year- are not statistically different. The discrete
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distributions for both surveys and classifications can be compared in Figure 2a
and Figure 2b.
Insert Figure 2a around here
Insert Figure 2b around here
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